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Scholarly work is its own tribute to a scholar, as are the contribu-
tions in both issues of this symposium to Jack Latty, whose scholarly
ideas, assessed appreciatively by Professor Lattin in the first issue,'
have invigorated the "field" of corporation law for more than thirty-
five years. So does the law school which he led as dean, and which
publishes this work, stand as one mark of his wider impact on legal
education. But the style and influence of the man would be missed in
a review of the area where he concentrated his academic interests
unless some observations were included about Latty as a "teaching
entrepreneur" and about "corporations" as an academic enterprise.
Teaching entrepreneurship is hereby defined as a form of associa-
tion comprising one person and an educational institution: purpose
is understood but not stated; control as a unitary concept cannot be
located; net gains cannot be measured or reported; services offered
are indefinable; periodic losses, acutely felt, are guaranteed; and the
risk of final judgment of failure is high, although bankruptcy per se
is rarely a cause of dissolution.
Law professors have no difficulty entering into such an associa-
tion because all law professors are gods, as most law students quickly
perceive without undue wonderment, or at least did in days when their
vision was clearer. The really troublesome gods are the greater ones,
like Latty. Fired by infernal questions that must be handed on, they
yearn restlessly for human form. The greatest, defying the disap-
proval of their peers, actually take it.
Thus came Professor Elvin R. Latty to Duke in 1937 in a gray,
tweed sport coat. (Later, as dean, he sported a homburg with equal
aplomb as he scoured the whole county for better students, better
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1938, LL.B. 1941, Duke
University.
1. Lattin, A Tribute to Dean Elvin R. Latty, 1972 DUKE L.J. 857.
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faculty, and more money for the law school.) He was known for
having taught romance languages and having coached track, suggest-
ing an enviable versatility, and it was said that he had forsaken, for
academe, a lucrative Wall Street practice. ("Lucrative" was pin-
pointed by student gossip at an incredibly high $10,000, then five
times the highest salary for beginning lawyers.) Latty was asked, as
a newcomer, to deliver a chapel talk in the gothic cathedral which
towers over the Duke campus. I do not remember the religious mes-
sage, but I do remember his sweeping up to the pulpit in flowing black
robes set off, perfectly for his personality, by white saddle shoes.
The saddle shoes were his trademark. They cushioned his swift,
last-minute entrance stride down the classroom aisle. He also wore
them to frequent law school social affairs, where everybody, in those
days, was dancing, and when law students whirled Mrs. Latty away,
he whirled away their dates with dignified ebullience.
His ebullience was undiminished in class, where the academic
message, unlike the chapel theme, was unforgettable. If it was not
then always perfectly clear, as with a Zen lesson, time lent it cohe-
sion. Its essence was the superior rating of the question over the
answer, if the two must be so ranked-a rating running contrary to
the suppositions of the uninitiated and the expectations of most stu-
dents. Isn't the known answer, after all, the objective, especially in
law? True, but the question is the indispensable means for getting it.
It can even shape the objective. It can unveil the pretensions and
reveal the complexities of the objective. It can bring an answer, but
so can it bring a realization that the answer is only an apparent one
and really a sinking mire.
Thus is Latty held in the mind's eye wielding his favorite short,
chopping tools: "what if," "what about," "how come," and "sup-
pose," pondering the ceiling with eyebrows raised, expecting or de-
manding attempts to answer, attempting himself, admitting baffle-
ment, shrugging, laughing at the legal or human predicament re-
vealed, reddening occasionally when two students in the back of the
room exchanged confidential answers. (If the conversation was intra
vires the subject, he wanted it disclosed; if not, he wanted it stopped.)
And thus can he be assured, if his mortal guise troubles him with
doubts about the immortality of his teaching, that he is still remem-
bered by thousands of lawyers everywhere, somewhat as a god, but
more as an engaging human. In their counseling, litigating, legislat-
ing, judging, reforming, teaching and using law, they cannot keep
from reflecting the searching, probing, "seeking" side of law, divine
and human, absorbed in large measure from Latty.
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For all those questions, it is now clear, served a common thrust:
to expose, as a first step, the uncompleted thinking shielded by doc-
trinal generalities, majestic legal phrases, and conclusory labels. Lay
bare the dimensions of the work to be done in making and reasoning
about hard choices, is the message, and you are on your way to
analyzing the crucial "facts" and considerations -that constitute the
conflict and the problem, and that have to be taken into account in
the solution. The interaction of those considerations and of legal
goals in decisions, statutes, and regulations can thus be isolated, and
from that isolation the further interaction of law and social policy can
be understood and planned.
Latty did not invent that way of thinking about law, but he epito-
mized it. In the 1930's, Columbia, where he did his doctoral work,
was a garden of legal realism. The main lines of that philosophy and
the inquiries it advocated were congruent with his own. The tenets of
legal realism and his teaching message emerge from his doctoral
thesis, later published in book form,2 in which he concentrated on an
issue in the heart of "corporations" as an academic subject: the rela-
tionship between the concept of incorporation and the insulation from
liability afforded individual and corporate shareholders under that
concept.
That insulation from owners' responsibility for the obligations of
an enterprise is a central attribute and advantage of the corporate
form. And the "separateness" of a legal corporate entity also insu-
lates other corporate entities, including those within the same busi-
ness or economic enterprise, from liability for the obligations of any
other. The insulation is said to be "normal," but it is not unfailing.
The terminology of its denial-that the corporate "veil" will be
"pierced," or the corporate "entity" "disregarded"-compels the
questions "when" and "why." The answers repeated in judicial opin-
ions-whenever it would be "equitable," or fraud would otherwise
result, or injustice would otherwise be done, or whenever the pierced
or disregarded entity is a mere agent, instrumentality, dummy, or
alter ego-illustrate the easy use of empty language. Behind such
contentless phrases, as Latty showed, are facts in such categories as
capital inadequacy, stopping short of steps to complete corporate
financing and operation, commingling or confusion of assets, and the
calculated policy of "milking" one entity for the benefit of another
2. E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS (1936).
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or for the entity's shareowners. Of further bearing are such factual
considerations as the nature of the liability asserted (a tort arising
from foreseeably dangerous activity?), the plaintiff's position (an
eyes-open contract creditor who "consented" to being relegated to
the assets of this entity?), and the defendant's interests (an individual
shareholder or a parent corporation with insulated individual share-
holders?).
Educationally, the implications from such factual considerations
suggest, on one issue alone, the real nature of a lawyer's work is
awareness, inquiry, and assessment of facts. Academically, also, pre-
dictable paths of decision are exposed by such an analysis. Putting
"disregard," for example, in the factual light of not separating, delib-
erately or negligently, the "estate" of one corporation from the sepa-
rate estate of the shareholder, or of a related corporation, as Latty
put it,3 illuminates one such path, if it is not mistaken as the only
path, through a tangled underbrush of judicial terminology. It also
invites new comparisons, such as juxtaposition of corporate asset
segregation with older and more familiar problems of the segregation
of partnership property from the partners' individual assets.
On the strictly practical side, no claim need be made that clarify-
ing theories bring quick order to a jungle of notions deeply rooted in
metaphor. "Disregard" cases are still ringing old changes fondly.'
Some courts may see the proferred light but brush it off. The facts
in Bartle v. Homeowners Cooperative Inc.,' for example, afforded the
New York Court of Appeals an opportunity, which it conspicuously
let pas , to illuminate the controlling considerations in its decision.
The subsidiary was milked. Eventually, and perhaps predictably, it
became bankrupt. It was organized, in the dissenting opinion's words,
to enable the parent cooperative corporation's shareholders to obtain
at cost houses constructed by the subsidiary, and "business was done
on such a basis that [the subsidiary] could not make a profit."6 The
dissent, citing Latty, viewed the factual situation as containing those
factors noted in Latty's book7 as present in cases in which the parent
3. Id. at 183-84.
4. E.g., Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1965); Tanner v.
Presidents-First Lady Spa, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 950, 956 (E.D. Mo. 1972); Fisher v. First Nat'l
Bank, 338 F. Supp. 525, 530 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Service Afloat, Inc. v. United States, 337 F.
Supp. 458, 464 (Cust. Ct. 1972); Penntube Plastic Co. v. Fluorotex, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 698,
702 (D.S.C. 1971); Hellenci Lines Ltd. v. Winkler, 249 F. Supp, 771, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
5. 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955).
6. Id. at 107; 127 N.E.2d at 834.
7. LATry, supra note 2, at 138-39.
1080 [Vol. 1972:1077
ELVIN R. LA TTY
corporation was held liable. The majority, noting that incorporation
is permitted "for the very purpose of escaping personal liability, ' 8
chose not to withhold insulation and not to elucidate. It observed only
that "the outward indicia of these two separate corporations was at
all times maintained. .. . ." that the creditors "were in no wise
misled," and that "there has been neither fraud, misrepresentation,
nor illegality."9 Thus tucked in with the usual phraseology was the
hint, though not an unmistakable one, that contract creditors dealing
with subsidiaries must take them as they are, no matter how they are,
as long as "form" is strictly observed. Left doubtful is whether such
a conclusion would apply only to creditors, like these, who knew that
the subsidiary was in a "difficult financial situation" and made an
extension agreement with it under which they even took over con-
struction responsibilities. Or, narrowing it still further, whether the
scale was tipped by the circumstance that the ultimate loss from a
successful claim would have fallen in some measure on returning
veterans who were helping themselves get low-cost housing by private
arrangements they thought would work.
The way of the world may not let us hope that all fog will be
dispelled by an assignment of precise weights to such Bartle factors
in every case. But a little gloom over the general trend is due when
the fog is thickened with recent, un-Latty-like remarks about the
anatomical characteristics of parent-subsidiary domination. In
Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,10 the plain, non-
biological facts were that the wholly-owned subsidiary (CBS Films,
Inc.) was organized to obtain general film distribution rights to shows
and films also televised on the network of the parent (CBS Inc.). The
directors and officers of the subsidiary were employees of the parent,
as is not uncommon, and the subsidiary was regarded by at least
some, on the testimony of a comptroller, as a "division" of the par-
ent. The plaintiff had devised a "fashion show" which was "scouted"
personally by the subsidiary's vice-president and the parent's director
of special events, after which the subsidiary obtained from the plain-
tiff the exclusive nine-year film distribution rights, and first refusal
for television broadcast, on the plaintiff's show, or any "similar type"
show, as produced in a pilot film made with advances from the sub-
sidiary. Then the same parent officer who had "scouted" the plain-
8. 309 N.Y. at 106, 127 N.E.2d at 833.
9. Id. at 106-07, 127 N.E.2d at 833.
10. 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1972).
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tiff's show worked with others to develop a second show "similar in
all material respects to the plaintiff's."" The parent obtained nine-
year exclusive broadcasting rights on the second show "and similar
shows" and televised the second show, but not the first. The plaintiff
alleged a breach by the parent of the plaintiff's contract with the
subsidiary on the grounds that the subsidiary was the "alter ego" and
mere "instrumentality" of.the parent. The district court treated both
corporations as one for purposes of the action.12 The Fifth Circuit
thought "it had no alternative but to reverse" because the plaintiff
"failed to prove" that the subsidiary was the "alter ego of the [parent]
defendant."13 Noting evidence, excluded by the district court as irrel-
evant, that the parent was not required to "buy," nor the subsidiary
to sell to the parent, all film acquired by the subsidiary, and finding
an absence of evidence of "actual" domination, the court said that
the potential for domination is not enough. 4 "Just as siamesing is a
biological fact," said the court, "so must corporate umbilication be
anatomically demonstrated under New York law,"' 5 noting in con-
clusion that:
New York law respects corporate identity, and its destruction by piercing or
surrogation requires substantiation of facts, not just organizational charts and
labels. The instrumentality referred to in New York cases requires a specific
kinetic result, and muscularity to effect such result must be demonstrated.
Plaintiff's omission to prove such muscularity constitutes his failing.,'
The parent control necessary for liability, then, is energetic domi-
nation manifested with muscle. Here no muscle was displayed. With-
out deploring at length the court's display of metaphor, Latty might
inquire, to show how facts reduce the meaning of metaphor, whether
the "muscle failure" owed anything to the fact, alluded to early in
the opinion, that the "commentator" for the plaintiff's show was the
wife of the subsidiary's vice-president. Did such a liaison between
the subsidiary and the plaintiff put the subsidiary and parent asunder
for this particular liability?
The value of such questions does not lie in one case, 7 one issue,
11. Id. at 993.
12. Id. at 994.
13. Id. at 997-98.
14. Id. at 998.
15. Id. at 996.
16. Id. at 998.
17. Similar relationships have been mentioned without indication of the weight, if any,
accorded them in decision. Thus, a principal was held not vicariously liable when an employee
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or one academic field. Latty pressed them in an early course he called
"Chattel Transactions," with mimeographed materials of his own,
about contentlessness in such words as "sale," "gift," "possession,"
and "property." More of the same inquiry came in his "Business
Associations," just as similar questions and similar methods charac-
terize teaching of lasting effect in any subject.
However fortifying to a teacher that his ideas apply beyond a
particular subject through a whole web of law, the web is made, in
school, of strands and sections. Some teachers barely get beyond a
necessary preoccupation with fascinating strands. A salute is due the
teacher who achieves identification with a whole section of the web,
and such a salute brings the state of that section under review.
In the forty years of Latty's interest, "Corporations" has been
cemented in central place in the curricula of most schools, held there
more by a tradition of supposed necessity than by popular interest.
Whether as a single course-required, recommended, or freely
elected-or as a basic segment of a major interest area of several
courses, or of a combined degree, the popular view has had it con-
cerned mostly with necessary formalities, internal organizational
technicalities, and the mechanics of commercially organized wealth.
Older casebooks steeped these ingredients in metaphysics. Mistrust
of corporations prevailed in the forepart of the century, and much of
the legal conflict raged on the battle-line of limitations on corporate
powers. Corporations were to be created for limited times and limited
purposes, to be specified, and one function of the law was to hold
them to those legal limitations. Vital questions were viewed, there-
fore, in terms of birth, being, and power. A leading casebook pub-
lished in 191311 devoted five of its ten chapters to "the legal concep-
tion of a corporation," "corporations de jure," "corporations de
facto," "the powers of a corporation," and "ultra vires"-all matters
treated now almost in passing, if at all.
Each new edition of later casebooks took on more than it un-
loaded or compressed about such items as proper and defective or-
injured a plaintiff who was the employee's friend. Dumas v. Lloyd, - Ill. App. 2d __, 286
N.E.2d 566 (1972). The insurance company of a master held vicariously liable when its servant
ran down his own father was held entitled to indemnity from the servant. Romford Ice & Coal
Storage Co. v.Lister [19561 2 Q.B. 180. A plaintiff principal in a negligence action was relieved
of any imputation of contributory negligence from the negligence in that transaction of the
principal's office manager, who was his son-in-law. Brown v. Poritzky, 30 N.Y.2d 289, 283
N.E.2d 751 (1972).
18. G. CANFIELD & I. WORMSER, CASES ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1913).
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ganization procedures, record inspection, shareholder lists, meeting
protocol, voting mechanics, article and bylaw provisions, organic
change requirements, and formalities of merger and dissolution. With
new federal securities materials added, the whole dry weight topped
out at 5-1/2 pounds and 1,816 pages for the latest edition of a well-
known casebook on corporations."9
What an academic subject with such an identity needs is an ident-
ity crisis. "Corporations," fortunately or not, has never been without
one. It has never been definable as the academic reflection of a spe-
cialized field of practice, with boundaries marked accordingly. "Cor-
poration lawyers"-firms with substantial practice for corporate
clients-are more likely to be worrying over an antitrust, tax, labor,
real estate, negotiable instruments, government regulations, or other
problem encompassed by other curricular subjects than a traditional
corporations one; and if it is a corporations one, it is rarely isolated
from one of the others. The other commercial subjects are sure
enough of their own academic boundaries to leave traditional "Cor-
porations" looking comparatively dispensable to many students free
to by-pass a reputedly dry, bulky, and esoteric elective.
Nonetheless, many old and new organizational issues and devel-
opments still do come together in a schema so coherent in underlying
theme, so intriguing when examined in relationship to each other, and
so close to grand questions of law, organized social effort, and indi-
vidual life, that they cannot be displaced from unitary consideration,
under whatever name, in a basic law curriculum. A banner they
would all go under is regulation of the resources and control of organ-
izational effort. The main theme is the interaction, and hence the fair
balance to be struck, between the advantages and benefits to insiders,
outsiders and society in the financing and control of an organized
effort, as against the risks, costs, and constraints which society should
impose on account of such benefits.
Under such a banner, with all that should be brought under it, one
can formulate criteria for jettisoning, or communicating in new ways,
much that is high-clerical only; putting trade-creditor protection
against financial skulduggery in reduced, modern perspective; and
getting together some strayed or straying areas needed for the vitality
of the whole.
19. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1969). A 1400-page
competitor, R. STEVENS & H. HENN, STATUTES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1965), weighs close to six pounds.
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One such area includes securities regulation issues involving
transfers of shares. Share transferability is a corporate advantage of
equal importance to shareholder non-liability. Legal issues involving
transfer, especially those touching financing, control, and the fidu-
ciary implications of the combination, were never isolated from cor-
porations when "investor protection" law was thin and over-
shadowed by the "creditor protection" function of stated capital.
Place was always made for the Old Dominion Copper cases,20 in
which the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined, in disagree-
ment with Mr. Justice Holmes and a majority of the United States
Supreme Court, that some redress would be provided in equity,
through the device of a corporate recovery, against promoters' du-
bious property transactions not disclosed to public investors in a later
original issuance from the corporation.
When federal statutes, mainly the Securities Act of 1933 (Securi-
ties Act)21 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)2
were enacted to afford more effective investor protection in connec-
tion with securities transfers, the misimpression arose that a body of
law independent from corporations had been created. This attitude
persisted as legislative concern, administrative actions, and judicial
decisions expanded the impact of those statutes. By 1946, the Ex-
change Act, which dealt mainly with post-distribution securities trad-
ing, although in language deriving from the Securities Act control of
initial public distributions, had already been extended to the affairs
of a two-family corporation in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.23
Latty foresaw in 19534 that this development in the Kardon case was
a portent of a wider impact for both statutes on a "private fight" over
a Main Street stores and "private" deals in close corporations.26
From then on, securities transfer control as a hook has held a
mounting weight of federal surveillance of corporte operations and
20. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1907); Old
Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
22. Id. §§ 78a-hh.
23. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). For a more recent case involving application of the
disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act to a "closely controlled three-person" corporation
previously conducted as three partnerships, see Levin v. Marder, 343 F. Supp. 1050 (W.D. Pa.
1972).
24. Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation
Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CoNrEMP. PROB. 505, 506 (1953).
25. Id. at 505.
26. Id. at 509.
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management, so that now the state legislative "enabling" approach
emerges as passive and ministerial by comparison, the state adminis-
trative "blue sky" approach as subordinate to the federal in most
states, and the procedural criteria for shareholder court action as
often pointless alongside federal statute-based actions brought
through civil, administrative, class, derivative, and criminal proceed-
ings in federal courts.
The need for the advanced "securities regulations" courses and
seminars which appeared in the 1960's to deal in detail and depth with
aspects of these and related statutes is not questioned and is in fact
confirmed by these developments. But the developments represent
too significant a shift from state to federal pre-occupation with the
legal affairs of all-sized enterprises, including small and non-
corporate, to await "advanced" consideration only. An offering of
costs and risks of control and financing without substantial and cohe-
sive treatment of these issues would be a crust without a large part
of the center.
In the last year, three more strong threads have woven securities
control closer into a pattern of general organizational control. First,
through the administrative actions of rule 144 and proposed rule
146, 2 the Securities and Exchange Commission tightened regulation
of the sale and resale of securities not involving any public offering
("restricted securities"), with an effect on the financial planning of
small and medium-sized corporations as great as many conventional
state rules on organization and capital maintenance. Second, through
private action, Tentative Draft No. 1 of a proposed Federal Securities
Code, 8 which was submitted for discussion to the American Law
Institute, represents a major effort to integrate the present bifurcated
approach, multiple registrations, and overlapping provisions affect-
, ing disclosure and transfers, into a consistent federal company regis-
tration and continual disclosure plan. An incidental result would be
to make less tenable the present division of the Securities Act prob-
lems largely in advanced courses and the Exchange Act problems in
a basic course. Third, the United States Supreme Court indicated,
without dissent, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co.,9 that "whatever might be available as a remedy under
27. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972), reprinted in 37 Fed. Reg. 596
(1972), and in 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1972). SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28,
1972), reprinted in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,108 (1972).
28. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
29. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). See Note, Bankers Life: Paying for a Corporation by Selling Its
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state law," section 10(b) of the Exchange Act should be given a broad
construction, not limited to "preserving the integrity of the securities
markets . . . , though that purpose is included,"3 to encompass
allegations against a controlling shareholder of a corporation for
diverting assets of the corporation by a complex fraudulent scheme
to obtain for that shareholder the $5,000,000 purchase price of his
shares.
As "Corporations" (or "organizations") embraces much new fed-
eral corporation law, it cannot neglect a second area commonly
eclipsed, if not excluded: small business proprietorship and partner-
ship. Agency is well gone as a separate study of common law princi-
ples and equitable considerations, as was partnership before it, and
as "Corporations" would be if confined to corporations. New flexibil-
ity of form in organizational planning is now available, however,
under a relaxing judicial attitude toward deviation from a single
norm, under close corporation statutes enacted in the wake of Latty's
pioneering drafting and "promotional" efforts in North Carolina ,3
and under tax provisions for tailoring features of different
associational forms into a single association.3 2 A more unitary grasp
of the principal tort, contracts, equity, and tax consequences of unin-
corporated and incorporated enterprises together thus becomes more
imperative than ever. Furthermore, neat division of subject matter
and courses between small business ("Main Street") and public cor-
porations ("Wall Street"), while attractive superficially, cannot be
made without severance of many basic principles common to both
and many basic problems involving both.
A "corporate" student, or lawyer, who does not know anything
about the idea of "authority," or what an unincorporated principal
or a partner is, or does, and why, will not know how to assess the
Securities Violates lOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 465. Bankers Life was followed in Jannes v. Micro-
wave Communications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972) (reversing the district court's ruling
that no federal claim was stated in a derivative action for waste and diversion of assets).
30. 404 U.S. at 12.
3 1. See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation
Act, 34 N.C.L. REV. 432 (1956); Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina
Business Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. REV. 26 (1954).
32. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 7701 defines organizations for tax purposes indepen-
dently of local law, so that a corporation for tax purposes may be an unincorporated associa-
tion. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 1371-1379 (Subchapter S), provides some non-
corporate tax advantages to certain corporations. The Treasury Department his acquiesced in
the treatment of certain professional associations as valid corporations for federal income tax
purposes. T.I.R. No. 1019, Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 278; Rev. Rul. 70-455, 1970-
2 CuM. BULL. 297.
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control and financing problems of a joint corporate business venture,
or a limited partnership with corporate partners, or a franchising
relationship or arrangement among corporations. Nor will he know
quite what to make of a corporate statutory provision that invites
"parties to the agreement or. . .stockholders of the corporation to
treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange
[corporate] relations. . . in a manner that would be appropriate only
among partners."33 Nor will he sense the difficulty in a partnership
statute that defines the partners' power to bind the partnership as
including acts which "apparently [carry] on in the usual way the
business of the partnership . . . unless . . . the person with whom
he is dealing . . .[knows] he has no such authority."34 Nor will he
react critically to an alleged partnership case that tells him that "the
true test of a partnership, at last, is left to be that of the relation of
the parties as principal and agent . . . ."I Nor will he approach
with confidence securities fraud litigation under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act such as a recent case against a brokerage firm whose
president allegedly persuaded the plaintiff customer to remove his
funds from the firm's care and repose them with the president in a
personal "Ponzi" scheme .3 Nor will he appreciate the implications
of the recent case of a personal, individual guaranty of business pur-
chases given to the plaintiff by three partners engaged in partnership
purchasing, but on which their liability was not asserted until eleven
months after they had incorporated that business and had been pur-
chasing from the plaintiff and paying as a corporation rather than a
partnership.37 In that case, the court suggested that the individual
defendants should have given "formal" notice to the plaintiff of their
switch from a partnership to a corporation. 3 The dissent believed
that the plaintiff's loss should be chargeable to "poor communica-
tion" between the plaintiff's credit and sales departments, thereby
causing the failure of the credit department to know that the plaintiff
was dealing with a corporation,39 perhaps implying that the old
partner-like personal guaranty by the business "owners" of the now-
33. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (Supp. 1968).
34. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 9(1). See, e.g., National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 249 N.C.
467, 106 S.E.2d 692 (1959).
35. Harvey v. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319, 22 Am. Rep. 387 (1876).
36. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972).
37. Kingsberry Homes v. Corey, 457 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 182.
39. Id. at 184.
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incorporated business was made legally ineffective by the change in
form, or that it was no longer an agreement of the parties.
Attempts to incorporate the unincorporated into published teach-
ing materials in "corporations" courses are not new. Professor Frey
started in 1935 with Corporations and Partnerships, which omitted a
discussion of agency." Latty put agency, partnership, and "related
topics in corporations" together in Introduction to Business
Associations in 1949 (Basic Business Associations since 1963). Pro-
fessor Conard's earlier editions on business organization in 1950,2
emphasizing the relationship of agency and employment, effect a
further integration, in 1972, in Enterprise Organization: Cases, Stat-
utes and Analysis on Employment - Agency - Partnerships -
Corporations." A final bridge in mind but not yet built will have to
unite the territory of these materials with larger areas of the land
lying in the leading casebooks on corporations. 4
Meanwhile, parallel work to distill and clarify the law will pro-
ceed apace, and will, if dreams come true, help trim it for the aca-
demic squeeze. Professor Loss, a Reporter for the proposed ALI
Federal Securities Code, is reducing the federal statutory material to
a single, compact, smooth-flowing, understandable instrument that
will be hailed with swift passage by a grateful Congress. Light, acces-
sible, and easy, it will be put out in large print for directors, stock-
brokers, retired investors and others with failing sight. Even if Con-
gress should balk, it would still be tucked as a thin pamphlet, a
nutshell of the law as it should be, into the pocket of every organiza-
tions casebook, and never have to bow, in law school, to the law in
the execrable form.
In the same spirit should hands be laid on the Uniform Partner-
40. A. FREY, CASES AND STATUTES ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (1935). A. FREY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS (1951).
41. E. LATTY, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1949).
E. LATTY & G. FRAMPTON, BASIC BUSINESS ASSOCIATONS: CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS
(1963).
42. A. CONARD, CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION: AGENCY AND EMPLOY-
MENT RELATIONS (1950). A. CONARD, CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION:
AGENCY-EMPLOYMENT-PARTNERSI1P-JOINT ENTERPRISES AND VENTURES (2d ed. 1957).
43. A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION: CASES, STATUTES
AND ANALYSIS ON LICENSING, EMPLOYMENT, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, ASSOCIATIONS AND
CORPORATIONS (1972).
44. CARY, supra note 19; N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES.
AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1968); A. FREY, C. MORRIS & J. CHOPER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS (1966); STEVENS & HENN, supra note 19.
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ship and Limited Partnership Acts, comprehensible only in conjunc-
tion within comprehensible common-law and equity doctrines which
the Acts aimed ambivalently to eliminate or codify. A new Uniform
Small Enterprises Act could bring to partnership, at last, the simpler
touch of the drafters of close corporation acts. The attempt to sub-
sume these organizational forms under a single statute would isolate
material for discard and illuminate material for academic regard.
Such reform would benefit the law and lawyers while demonstrating
concurrently the feasibility of putting these problems academically
and practicably together.
As "corporations" makes room for non-corporations, let it also
admit non-business corporations, a third area currently divorced
from corporations, if curricularly recognized at all. In the last
hundred years the production of goods and services, the accumulation
of wealth, and the application of legal talent and ingenuity have been
associated with business corporations. Organization for profit has
furnished the conflicts, the precedents, and the procedures.
The future, however, seems more bound than before to organiza-
tions that may generate motivations beyond profit for taxable distri-
bution to "owners": nonprofit corporations, cooperatives, profes-
sional corporations, community development corporations, and cer-
tain unincorporated associations. Basic organizational inquiry, there-
fore, should not be cut off from the features and problems of non-
profit organizations. It is true that the purposes of these organiza-
tions drastically alter the context. But even without the interesting
legal questions of profit-nonprofit borderlines, organizational issues
involving non-business resources, costs, and controls may be use-
fully analogized, to business precedents, with mutual advantage to
the understanding and legal development of both types.
If the goal of embracing all that is essential seems possible,
though hard, there is still the unsolved, perhaps unsolvable, accom-
modation of a fourth area vital to "Corporations": an understanding
of accounting, the symbolic language in which capital, costs, risks,
profits, and prospects are assessed and measured. Accounting illiter-
acy among law students continues to be widespread, for law schools
still eschew subject entrance requirements and still purport not to
teach basic communication in such symbolic languages.
Organizations, those in control of organizations, accountants, and
even some investors are under legal strictures to communicate in
accounting language about matters subject to legal controls, and a
total ignorance of the language can be totally incapacitating for anal-
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ysis of many legal issues. Professor Kripke has recently made plain,
for example, the sterility of approaching the key phrase of "material
fact" in the law of disclosure without reference to financial state-
ments and accounting principles and practices.4 5
Of "legal accounting" books, only one, Professor Katz' little vol-
ume46 (230 pages) "for students and . . . lawyers . . . [having] no
acquaintance with the subject,"47 is directed primarily to basic reme-
dial help. It was designed in 1954 to be taken "before the courses in
corporation law and taxation,""8 which is rightly said but not readily
"done in a compressed curriculum where basic courses presuppose this
basic skill.
Latty tried a different alternative, more than thirty years ago,
when he interrupted his corporations class for a few days or weeks
to inject his own simplified, but relatively complete, basic course in
bookkeeping and accounting. The solution was admirably direct, but
in view of the cost in course time, necessarily short-term.
No long-term solution completely inside or completely outside the
afflicted courses may be possible without new innovative arrange-
ments involving the institution itself and the courses suffering most
from the condition. The law school could subsidize special induce-
ments or requirements, possibly impinging on first-year free time,
that would combine the use of self-help guides, such as the basic
accounting books for lawyers published by continuing legal education
institutes,49 short-course orientations, demonstrations, videotapes,
and computerized forms of programmed learning that have proved
successful in other language and learning fields in reducing time and
increasing efficiency in the acquisition of basic skills.
Attempts to bring all these areas into the focus of one academic
subject, especially into one course, will be resisted as embracing too
much too superficially. The painful choices, though, seem inevitable.
The day is coming none too soon-and rightly, in my view-when the
second year of law will be the final one for those who choose to make
it so. The second year will call for work in depth and detail on matter
already related in a general and completed over-view. It will be differ-
45. See Kripke, Rule lOb-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts," 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1061
(1971).
46. W. KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING (1954).
47. Id. at iii.
48. Id.
49. B. FERST & S. FERST, BASIC ACCOUNTnIG FOR LAWYERS (ALl) (2d ed. 1965); C.
OEHLER, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS (PLI) (2d ed. 1953).
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entiable from the first year by teaching methods and institutional
provisions designed for such advanced work and understanding. (The
third year, if taken at all, would put the individual almost completely
on his own.)
A "subject" that cannot be made available in one course in such
a regimen, and cannot be grasped profitably in broad, cohesive out-
lines by even a first-year student, will survive only as a specialty of
limited interest. Legal problems in the context of basic organizational
planning should escape that fate. Against other contexts of issues
contesting for the finite hours of the main curriculum, these are by
no measure too settled, too esoteric, too peripheral, or too mundane.
Not just to satisfy the search for the identity of "organizations," nor
just to preserve the teaching spirit of Latty as he concentrated it on
this section of law, these issues and problems should survive as a
curricular core together, as does his teaching message, by reason of
their natural alliance with the central concerns of education, law and
social policy.
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